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Do online consumer reviews affect restaurant demand?  I investigate this question using a novel 
dataset combining reviews from the website Yelp.com and restaurant data from the Washington 
State  Department  of  Revenue.    Because  Yelp  prominently  displays  a  restaurant's  rounded 
average rating, I can identify the causal impact of Yelp ratings on demand with a regression 
discontinuity framework that exploits Yelp‟s rounding thresholds.  I present three findings about 
the impact of consumer reviews on the restaurant industry: (1) a one-star increase in Yelp rating 
leads to a 5-9 percent increase in revenue, (2) this effect is driven by independent restaurants; 
ratings do not affect restaurants with chain affiliation, and (3) chain restaurants have declined in 
market share as Yelp penetration has increased.  This suggests that online consumer reviews 
substitute  for  more  traditional  forms  of  reputation.  I  then  test  whether  consumers  use  these 
reviews in a way that is consistent with standard learning models.  I present two additional 
findings: (4) consumers do not use all available information and are more responsive to quality 
changes that are more visible and (5) consumers respond more strongly when a rating contains 
more information.  Consumer response to a restaurant‟s average rating is affected by the number 
of reviews and whether the reviewers are certified as “elite” by Yelp, but is unaffected by the 
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1  Introduction 
Technological  advances  over  the  past  decade  have  led  to  the  proliferation  of  consumer 
review  websites  such  as  Yelp.com,  where  consumers  can  share  experiences  about  product 
quality.  These reviews provide consumers with information about experience goods, which have 
quality that is observed only after consumption.  With the click of a button, one can now acquire 
information from countless other consumers about products ranging from restaurants to movies 
to physicians.  This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of consumer reviews in the 
restaurant industry. 
It  is  a  priori  unclear  whether  consumer  reviews  will  significantly  affect  markets  for 
experience goods.  On the one hand, existing mechanisms aimed at solving information problems 
are imperfect: chain affiliation reduces product differentiation, advertising can be costly, and 
expert reviews tend to cover small segments of a market.
1  Consumer reviews  may therefore 
complement or substitute for existing information sources .  On the other hand, reviews can be 
noisy and difficult to interpret because they are based on subjective information  reflecting the 
views of a non-representative sample of consumers.  Further, consumers must actively seek out 
reviews, in contrast to mandatory disclosure and electronic commerce settings.
 2  
 How do online consumer reviews affect markets for experience goods?  Using a novel data 
set consisting of reviews from the website Yelp.com and revenue data from the Washington 
State Department of Revenue, I present three key findings: (1) a one-star increase in Yelp rating 
leads to a 5-9 percent increase in revenue, (2) this effect is driven by independent restaurants; 
ratings do not affect restaurants with chain affiliation, and (3) chain restaurants have declined in 
revenue  share  as  Yelp  penetration  has  increased.   Consistent  with  standard  learning  models, 
                                                           
1 For example, Zagat covers only about 5% of restaurants in Los Angeles, according to Jin and Leslie (2009). 
2 For an example of consumer reviews in electronic commerce, see Cabral and Hortacsu (2010).  For an example of 
the impact of mandatory disclosure laws, see Mathios (2000), Jin and Leslie (2003), and Bollinger et al. (2010). 3 
 
consumer response is larger when ratings contain more information.  However, consumers also 
react more strongly to information that is more visible, suggesting that the way information is 
presented matters.   
To construct the data set for this analysis, I worked with the Washington State Department of 
Revenue to gather revenues for all restaurants in Seattle from 2003 through 2009.  This allows 
me to observe an entire market both before and after the introduction of Yelp.  I focus on Yelp 
because it has become the dominant source of consumer reviews in the restaurant industry.  For 
Seattle alone, the website had over 60,000 restaurant reviews covering 70% of all operational 
restaurants  as  of  2009.    By  comparison,  the  Seattle  Times  has  reviewed  roughly  5%  of 
operational Seattle restaurants.   
To  investigate  the  impact  of  Yelp,  I  first  show  that  changes  in  a  restaurant‟s  rating  are 
correlated  with  changes  in  revenue,  controlling  for  restaurant  and  quarter  fixed  effects.  
However, there can be concerns about interpreting this as causal if changes in a restaurant‟s 
rating are correlated with other changes in a restaurant‟s reputation that would have occurred 
even in the absence of Yelp.  This is a well-known challenge to identifying the causal impact of 
any type of reputation on demand, as described in Eliashberg and Shugan (1997).   
To support the claim that Yelp has a causal impact on revenue, I exploit the institutional 
features of Yelp to isolate variation in a restaurant‟s rating that is exogenous with respect to 
unobserved determinants of revenue.  In addition to specific reviews, Yelp presents the average 
rating  for  each  restaurant,  rounded  to  the  nearest  half-star.    I  implement  a  regression 
discontinuity  (RD)  design  around  the  rounding  thresholds,  taking  advantage  of  this  feature.  
Essentially,  I  look  for  discontinuous  jumps  in  revenue  that  follow  discontinuous  changes  in 
rating.  One common challenge to the RD methodology is gaming: in this setting, restaurants 4 
 
may submit false reviews.  I then implement the McCrary (2008) density test to rule out the 
possibility that gaming is biasing the results.  If gaming were driving the result, then one would 
expect ratings to be clustered just above the discontinuities.  However, this is not the case.  More 
generally, the results are robust to many types of firm manipulation. 
Using the RD framework, I find that a restaurant‟s average rating has a large impact on 
revenue  -  a  one-star  increase  leads  to  a  5-9  percent  increase  in  revenue  for  independent 
restaurants, depending on the specification.  The identification strategy used in this paper shows 
that Yelp affects demand, but is also informative about the way that consumers use information.  
If information is costless to use, then consumers should not respond to rounding, since they also 
see the underlying reviews.  However, a growing literature has shown that consumers do not use 
all  available  information  (Dellavigna  and  Pollet  2007;  2010).    Further,  responsiveness  to 
information can depend not only on the informational content, but also on  the simplicity of 
calculating the information of interest (Chetty et al. 2009, Finkelstein 2009).  Moreover, many 
restaurants on Yelp receive upward of two hundred reviews, making it time-consuming to read 
them all.  Hence, the average rating may serve as a simplifying heuristic to help consumers learn 
about restaurant quality in the face of complex information.   
Next, I examine the impact of Yelp on revenues for chain restaurants.  As of 2007, roughly 
$125 billion per year is spent at chain restaurants, accounting for over 50% of all restaurant 
spending in the United States.  Chains share a brand name (e.g., Applebee‟s or McDonald‟s), and 
often have common menu items, food sources, and advertising.  In a market with more products 
than a consumer can possibly sample, chain affiliation provides consumers with information 
about the quality of a product.  Because consumers have more information about chains than 
about independent restaurants, one might expect Yelp to have a larger effect on independent 5 
 
restaurants.    My  results  demonstrate  that  despite  the  large  impact  of  Yelp  on  revenue  for 
independent restaurants; the impact is statistically insignificant and close to zero for chains.   
Empirically, changes in a restaurant‟s rating affect revenue for independent restaurants but 
not for chains.  A standard information model would then predict that Yelp would cause more 
people to choose independent restaurants over chains.  I test this hypothesis by estimating the 
impact of Yelp penetration on revenue for chains relative to independent restaurants. The data 
confirm  this  hypothesis.    I  find  that  there  is  a  shift  in  revenue  share  toward  independent 
restaurants and away from chains as Yelp penetrates a market. 
Finally,  I investigate whether  the observed response to  Yelp  is  consistent with Bayesian 
learning.  Under the Bayesian hypothesis, reactions to signals are stronger when the signal is 
more precise (i.e., the rating contains a lot of information).  I identify two such situations.  First, 
a restaurant‟s average rating aggregates a varying number of reviews.  If each review presents a 
noisy  signal  of  quality,  then  ratings  that  contain  more  reviews  contain  more  information.  
Further, the number of reviews is easily visible next to each restaurant.  Consistent with a model 
of Bayesian learning, I show that market responses to changes in a restaurant‟s rating are largest 
when a restaurant has many reviews.  Second, a restaurant‟s reviews could be written by high 
quality or low quality reviewers.  Yelp designates prolific reviewers with “elite” status, which is 
visible to website readers.  Reviews can be sorted by whether the reviewer is elite.  Reviews 
written by elite members have nearly double the impact as other reviews.   
This final point adds to the literature on consumer sophistication in responses to quality 
disclosure, which has shown mixed results.  Scanlon et al. (2002), Pope (2009), and Luca and 
Smith (2010) all document situations where consumers rely on very coarse information, while 
ignoring finer details.  On the other hand, Bundorf et al (2009) show evidence of consumer 6 
 
sophistication.  When given information about birth rates and patient age profiles at fertility 
clinics, consumers respond more to high birth rates when the average patient age is high.  This 
suggests that consumers infer something about the patient mix.  Similarly, Rockoff et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that school principals respond to noisy information about teacher quality in a 
way that is consistent with Bayesian learning.  My results confirm that there is a non-trivial cost 
of  using information,  but  consumers act  in  a  way that is  consistent  with  Bayesian learning, 
conditional on easily accessible information. 
Overall, this paper presents evidence that consumers use Yelp to learn about independent 
restaurants but not those with chain affiliation.  Consumer response is consistent with a model of 
Bayesian learning with information gathering costs.  The introduction of Yelp then begins to 
shift revenue away from chains and toward independent restaurants. 
The regression discontinuity design around rounding rules offered in this paper will also 
allow for identification of the causal impact of reviews in a wide variety of settings, helping to 
solve a classic endogeneity problem.  For example, Amazon.com has consumer reviews that are 
aggregated  and  presented  as  a  rounded  average.    RottenTomatoes.com  presents  movie  critic 
reviews as  either “rotten” or “fresh,” even though the underlying reviews are assigned  finer 
grades.  Gap.com now allows consumers to review clothing; again, these reviews are rounded to 
the  half-star.    For  each  of  these  products  and  many  more,  there  is  a  potential  endogeneity 
problem where product reviews are correlated with underlying quality.  With only the underlying 
reviews  and  an  outcome  variable  of  interest,  my  methodology  shows  how  it  is  possible  to 
identify the causal impact of reviews.   
 
   7 
 
2  Data 
I combine two datasets for this paper: restaurant reviews from Yelp.com and revenue data 
from the Washington State Department of Revenue.   
 
2.1 Yelp.com 
Yelp.com  is  a  website  where  consumers  can  leave  reviews  for  restaurants  and  other 
businesses.  Yelp was founded in 2004, and is based in San Francisco.  The company officially 
launched its website in all major west coast cities (and select other cities) in August of 2005, 
which includes Seattle.  It currently contains over 10 million business reviews, and receives 
approximately 40 million unique visitors (identified by IP address) per month.   
Yelp is part of a larger crowdsourcing movement that has developed over the past decade, 
where  the  production  of  product  reviews,  software,  and  encyclopedias,  among  others  are 
outsourced to large groups of anonymous volunteers rather than paid employees.  The appendix 
shows trends in search volumes for Yelp, Trip Advisor, and Angie‟s List, which underscores the 
growth of the consumer review phenomenon.  
On Yelp, people can read restaurant reviews and people can write restaurant reviews.  In 
order to write a review, a user must obtain a free account with Yelp, which requires registering a 
valid email address.  The users can then rate any restaurant (from 1-5 stars), and enter a text 
review.   
Once a review is written, anyone (with or without an account) can access the website for free 
and read the review.  Readers will come across reviews within the context of a restaurant search, 
where the reader is trying to learn about the quality of different restaurants.  Figure 1 provides a 
snapshot of a restaurant search in Seattle.  Key to this paper, readers can look for restaurants that 8 
 
exceed a specified average rating (say 3.5 stars).  Readers can also search within a food category 
or location.   
A reader can click on an individual restaurant, which will bring up more details about the 
restaurant.  As shown in Figure 2, the reader will then be able to read individual reviews, as well 
as see qualitative information about the restaurants features (location, whether it takes credit 
cards, etc). 
Users may choose to submit reviews for many reasons.  Yelp provides direct incentives for 
reviewers, such as having occasional parties for people who have submitted a sufficiently large 
number of reviews.  Wang (2010) looks across different reviewing systems (including Yelp) to 
analyze the social incentives for people who decide to submit a review. 
 
2.2 Restaurant Data 
I take the Department of Revenue data to be the full set of restaurants in the city of Seattle.  
The data contains every restaurant that reported earning revenue at any point between January 
2003 and October 2009.  The Department of Revenue assigns each restaurant a unique business 
identification code (UBI), which I use to identify restaurants.  In total, there are 3,582 restaurants 
during the period of interest.  On average, there are 1,587 restaurants open during a quarter.  This 
difference between these two numbers is accounted for by the high exit and entry rates in the 
restaurant industry.  Approximately 5% of restaurants go out of business each quarter. 
Out of the sample, 143 restaurants are chain affiliated.  However, chain restaurants tend to 
have a lower turnover rate.  In any given quarter, roughly 5% of restaurants are chains.  This can 
be compared to Jin and Leslie (2009), who investigate chains in Los Angeles.  Roughly 11% of 
restaurants in their sample are chains.  Both of these cities have substantially smaller chain 9 
 
populations than the nation as a whole, largely because chains are more common in rural areas 
and along highways.     
The  Department  of  Revenue  divides  restaurants  into  three  separate  subcategories,  in 
accordance with the North American Industry Classification System: Full Service Restaurants, 
Limited Service Restaurants,  and Cafeterias,  Grills,  and Buffets.   Roughly two-thirds of the 
restaurants are full service, with most of the others falling under the limited service restaurants 
category (only a handful are in the third group). 
 
2.3 Aggregating Data 
I manually merged the revenue data with the Yelp reviews, inspecting the two datasets for 
similar or matching names.  When a match was  unclear,  I referred to the address  from  the 
Department of Revenue listing.  Table 1 summarizes Yelp penetration over time.  By October of 
2009, 69% of restaurants were on Yelp.  To see the potential for Yelp to change the way firms 
build reputation, consider the fact that only 5% of restaurants are on Zagat (Jin and Leslie, 2009).   
The final dataset is at the restaurant quarter level.  Table 2 summarizes the revenue and 
review data for each restaurant quarter.  The mean rating is 3.6 stars out of 5.  On average, a 
restaurant receives 3 reviews per quarter, with each of these reviewers having 245 friends on 
average.  Of these reviews, 1.4 come from elite reviewers.  “Elite” reviewers are labeled as such 
by Yelp based on the quantity of reviews as well as other criteria.    
One challenge with the revenue data is that it is quarterly.  For the OLS regressions, I simply 
use the average rating for the duration of the quarter.   For the regression discontinuity, the 
process is slightly more complicated.  For these observations, I do the following.  If the rating 
does not change during a given quarter, then I leave it as is.  If the rating does cross a threshold 10 
 
during a quarter, then I assign the treatment variable based on how many days the restaurant 
spent  on  each  side  of  the  discontinuity.    If  more  than  half  of  the  days  were  above  the 
discontinuity, then I identify the restaurant as above the discontinuity.
3    
 
 
3  Empirical Strategy 
I  use  two  identification  strategies.    I  implement  a  regression  discontinuity  approach  to 
support the hypothesis that Yelp has a causal impact.  I then apply fixed effects regressions to 
estimate the heterogeneous effects of Yelp ratings. 
 
3.1 Impact of Yelp on Revenue 
The first part of the analysis establishes a relationship between a restaurant‟s Yelp rating and 
revenue.  I use a fixed effects regression to identify this effect.  The regression framework is as 
follows: 
                                               
where rating is                 is the log of revenue for restaurant j in quarter t,           is the 
rating for restaurant j in quarter t.  The regression also allows for year and restaurant specific 
unobservables.    is the coefficient of interest, which tells us the impact of a 1 star improvement 
in rating on a restaurant‟s revenue.  While a positive coefficient on rating suggests that Yelp has 
a causal impact, there could be concern that Yelp ratings are correlated with other factors that 
                                                           
3 An alternative way to run the regression discontinuity would be to assign treatment based on the restaurant’s 
rating at the beginning of the quarter. 11 
 
affect  revenue.    To  support  the  causal  interpretation,  I  turn  to  a  regression  discontinuity 
framework. 
 
3.2 Regression Discontinuity 
Recall that Yelp displays the average rating for each restaurant.  Users are able to limit 
searches to restaurants with a given average rating.  These average ratings are rounded to the 
nearest half a star.  Therefore, a restaurant with a 3.24 rating will be rounded to 3 stars, while a 
restaurant with a 3.25 rating will be rounded to 3.5 stars, as in Figure 5.  This provides variation 
in the rating that is displayed to consumers that is exogenous to restaurant quality. 
I can look at restaurants with very similar underlying ratings, but which have a half-star gap 
in what is shown to consumers.  To estimate this, I restrict the sample to all observations in 
which a restaurant is less than 0.1 stars from a discontinuity.  This estimate measures the average 
treatment effect for restaurants that benefit from receiving an extra half star due to rounding.  I 
also present estimates for alternative choices of bandwidth. 
 
3.2.1  Potential Outcomes Framework 
The estimation is as follows.  First, define the binary variable T: 
    {
                                                                      
                                                                          
 
For example, T = 0 if the rating is 3.24, since a Yelp reader would see 3 stars as the average 
rating.  Similarly, T=1 if the rating is 3.25, since a Yelp reader would see 3.5 stars as the average 
rating. 
The outcome variable of interest is ln (Revenuejt).  The regression equation is then simply: 
  (         )                                      12 
 
where β is the coefficient of interest.  It tells us the impact of an exogenous one-half star increase 
in a restaurant‟s rating on revenue.  The variable      is the unrounded average rating.  The 
coefficient of interest then tells us the impact of moving from just below a discontinuity to just 
above a discontinuity, controlling for the continuous change in rating.  
  In the main specification, I include only the restricted sample of restaurants that are less 
than 0.1 stars away from a discontinuity.  To show that the result is not being driven by choice of 
bandwidth, I allow for alternative bandwidths.  To show that the result is not being driven by 
non-linear responses to continuous changes in rating,  I allow for a break in  response to the 
continuous measure around the discontinuity.  I also allow for non-linear responses to rating.    I 
then perform tests of identifying assumptions. 
 
 
3.3 Heterogeneous impact of Yelp 
After providing evidence that Yelp has a causal impact on restaurant revenue, I investigate 
two questions regarding heterogeneous impacts of Yelp.  First, I test the hypothesis that Yelp has 
a smaller impact on chains.  The estimating equation is as follows: 
                                                                     
The coefficient of interest is then  .  A negative coefficient implies that ratings have a smaller 
impact on revenue for chain restaurants. 
  I then test whether consumer response is consistent with a model of Bayesian learning.  
The estimating equation is as follows:  
                                                                       13 
 
The variable                    interacts a rating with the amount of noise in the rating.  A 
Bayesian model predicts that if the signal is less noisy, then the reaction should be stronger.  The 
variable                             interacts a rating with the precision of prior beliefs about 
restaurant quality.  Bayesian learning would imply that the market reacts less strongly to new 
signals when prior beliefs are more precise.  All specifications will include restaurant and year 
fixed effects.  
Empirically, I will identify situations were ratings contain more and less information and 
where prior information is more and less precise.  I will then construct the interaction terms 
between these variables and a restaurants rating. 
There are two ways in which I measure noise.  First, I consider the number of reviews 
that have been left for a restaurant.  If each review provides a noisy signal of quality, then the 
average rating presents a more precise signal as there are more reviews left for each restaurant.  
Bayesian learners would then react more strongly to a change in rating when there are more total 
reviews.  Second, I consider reviews left by elite reviewers, who have been certified by Yelp.  If 
reviews by elite reviewers contain more information, then Bayesian learners should react more 
strongly to them. 
 
4  Impact of Yelp on Revenue 
Table 3 establishes a relationship between a restaurant‟s rating and revenue.  A one-star 
increase is associated with a 5.4% increase in revenue, controlling for restaurant and quarter 
specific unobservables.  The concern with this specification is that changes in a restaurant‟s 
rating  may  be  correlated  with  other  changes  in  a  restaurant‟s  reputation.    In  this  case,  the 
coefficient on Yelp rating might be biased by factors unrelated to Yelp. 14 
 
To reinforce the causal interpretation, I turn to the regression discontinuity approach.  In this 
specification, I look at restaurants that switch from being just below a discontinuity to just above 
a  discontinuity.    I  allow  for  a  restaurant  fixed  effect  because  of  a  large  restaurant-specific 
component  to  revenue  that  is  fixed  across  time.    Figure  4  provides  a  graphical  analysis  of 
demeaned revenues for restaurants just above and just below a rounding threshold.  One can see 
a discontinuous jump in revenue.  Table 4 reports the main result, with varying controls.  Table 4 
considers only restaurants that are within a 0.1-star radius of a discontinuity.  Table 5 varies the 
bandwidth. 
I find that an exogenous one-star improvement leads to a roughly 9% increase in revenue.  
(Note that the shock is one-half star, but I renormalize for ease of interpretation).  The result 
provides support to the claim that Yelp has a causal effect on demand.  In particular, whether a 
particular restaurant is rounded up or rounded down should be uncorrelated with other changes in 
reputation outside of Yelp.   
The magnitude of this effect can be compared to the existing literature on the impact of 
information.  Gin and Leslie (2003) show that when restaurants are forced to post hygiene report 
cards, a grade of A leads to a 5% increase in revenue relative to other grades.  In the online 
auction setting, Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) show that a seller experiences a 13% drop in sales 
after the first bad review.  In contrast to the electronic commerce setting, Yelp is active in a 
market where (1) other types of reputation exist since the market is not anonymous (and many 
restaurants are chain-affiliated), (2) there may be a high cost to starting a new firm or changing 
names, leaving a higher degree of variation in rating, and (3) consumers must actively seek 
information, rather than being presented with it at the point of purchase. 15 
 
In addition to identifying the causal impact of Yelp, the regression discontinuity estimate is 
information about the way that consumers use Yelp.  First, it tells us that Yelp as a new source of 
information is becoming an important determinant of restaurant demand.  The popularization of 
the internet has provided a forum where consumers can share experiences, which is becoming an 
important source of reputation.  Second, the mean rating is a salient feature in the way that 
consumers  use  Yelp.    Consumers  respond  to  discontinuous  jumps  in  the  average  rating.  
Intuitively, the average rating provides a simple feature that is easy to use.  Third, this implies 
that consumers do not use all available information, but instead use the rounded rating as a 
simplifying heuristic.  Specifically, if attention was unlimited, then consumers would be able to 
observe changes to the mean rating based on the underlying reviews.  Then the rounded average 
would be pay-off irrelevant.    Instead,  consumers use the discontinuous rating, which is  less 
informative than the underlying rating but also less costly (in terms of time and effort) to use. 
 
 
4.1 Identifying Assumptions 
This regression discontinuity approach heavily relies on random assignment of restaurants to 
either side of the rounding thresholds.  Specifically, the key identifying assumption is that as we 
get closer and closer to a rounding threshold, all revenue-affecting predetermined characteristics 
of  restaurants  become  increasingly  similar.    Restricting  the  sample  to  restaurants  with  very 
similar ratings, we can simply compare the revenues of restaurants that are rounded up to the 
revenues of restaurants that are rounded down.   
This helps to avoid many of the potential endogeneity issues that occur when looking at the 
sample  as  a  whole.    In  particular,  restaurants  with  high  and  low  Yelp  scores  may  be  very 16 
 
different.  Even within a restaurant, reputational changes outside of Yelp may be correlated with 
changes in Yelp rating over time.  However, the differences should shrink as the average rating 
becomes more similar.  
For  restaurants  with  very  similar  ratings,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  restaurants 
changes that are unrelated to Yelp would be uncorrelated with whether a restaurant‟s Yelp rating 
is  rounded  up  or  rounded  down.    The  following  section  addresses  potential  challenges  to 
identification. 
 
4.1.1  Potential Manipulation of Ratings 
One challenge for identification in a regression discontinuity design is that any threshold that 
is seen by the econometrician might also be known to the decision makers of interest.  This can 
cause concerns about gaming, as discussed in McCrary (2008).  In the Yelp setting, the concern 
would be that certain types of restaurants submit their own reviews in order to increase their 
revenue.  This type of behavior could bias the OLS estimates in this paper if there is a correlation 
between a firm‟s revenue and decision to game the system.  The bias could go in either direction, 
depending on whether high revenue or low revenue firms are more likely to game the system.  In 
this section, I address the situation that could lead to spurious results.  I then argue that selective 
gaming is not causing a spurious correlation between ratings and revenues in the regression 
discontinuity framework.   
In order for the regression discontinuity estimates to be biased, it would have to be the case 
that restaurants  with  especially high  (or alternatively with  especially low) revenue are more 
likely to game the system.  This is certainly plausible.  However, it would also have to be the 
case  that  these  restaurants  stop  submitting  fake  reviews  once  they  get  above  a  certain 17 
 
discontinuity.  In other words, if some restaurants decided to submit fake reviews while others 
did not, the identification would still be valid.   
In order to invalidate the regression discontinuity identification, a restaurant would have to 
submit inflated reviews to go from a rating of 2.2 stars, only to stop when it gets to 2.4 stars.  
However, if a restaurant stopped gaming as soon as it jumped above a discontinuity, the next 
review could just drop it back down.  While the extent of gaming is hard to say, it is a very 
restrictive type of gaming that would lead to spurious estimates.   
I offer two further arguments against the gaming hypothesis: one economic and the other 
statistical.  First, suppose the concern is that restaurants are gaming in this sophisticated manner, 
leading  to  a  spurious  impact  of  rating  where  none  exists.    This  argument  becomes  circular 
because if no effect exists, then restaurants should not have the incentive to invest in gaming.  
Therefore even the existence of gaming would require that Yelp has a causal effect on revenue. 
The second piece of evidence against the gaming hypothesis is based on a test offered by 
McCrary (2008).  The intuition of the test is as follows.  Suppose that restaurants were gaming 
Yelp in a way that would bias the results.  Then, one would expect to see a disproportionately 
large number of restaurants just above the rounding thresholds.  
I construct the test in the following way.  I begin with a dataset at the restaurant / review 
level.  For example, a restaurant that has  five reviews would have five observations.    The 
variable of interest would be the average rating after each review.  If there was gaming, there 
should be “too many” observations with ratings just above rounding thresholds.   
To formally test for this, I sum the number of observations for each 0.05-star interval, and 
compute the probability mass for each interval.  I create a binary variable to indicate bins that fall 
just above a rounding threshold (e.g., 3.25-3.3 stars, 3.75-3.8 stars).  The dependent variable is 18 
 
the probability mass, and the independent variable is the indicator for bins that fall just above the 
discontinuity. 
Table 6 presents the results of this test.  The test shows that there is not any clustering of 
restaurants just above the discontinuity, suggesting that manipulation is not an issue with the 
regression discontinuity design. 
 
5  The Impact of Yelp on Chains 
How  does  the  introduction  of  a  new  technology  that  increases  information  flow  affect 
restaurants with chain affiliation?  Historically, chain affiliation is valuable precisely because it 
reduces uncertainty about restaurant quality.  Consumer reviews are coming to serve a similar 
purpose.  
There are two ways in which Yelp ratings might affect chains.  First, a chain‟s rating on Yelp 
may have an effect on revenue.  Second, Yelp may cause an overall shift in demand between 
chains and independent restaurants if Yelp is providing more information about  independent 
restaurants than about chains.  In this section, I investigate both effects. 
  
5.1 Do Ratings Affect Chains? 
Table 7 presents the differential impact of Yelp ratings on chain restaurants.  While ratings 
have  a large impact on revenue overall, the effect is being driven entirely from independent 
restaurants.  Because chains already have relatively little uncertainty about quality, their demand 
does not respond to consumer reviews 
 
5.2 Do Consumer Reviews Crowd Out Demand for Chains? 19 
 
Given  the  differential  impact  of  Yelp  on  chains  and  independent  restaurants,  one  might 
expect  chains  to  become  less  popular  after  the  introduction  of  Yelp.    This  is  because  the 
increased information about independent restaurants leads to a higher expected utility conditional 
on going to an independent, restaurant.  Hence Yelp should not only shift  demand between 
independent restaurants, it should also increase the value of going to an independent restaurant 
relative to a chain. 
Consistent with this, table 8 shows that chains experienced a decline in revenue relative to 
independent restaurants in the post-Yelp period.  Higher Yelp penetration leads to an increase in 
revenue for independent restaurants, but a decrease in revenue for chain restaurants.   
One  may  be  concerned  with  this  specification  if  chain  restaurants  had  been  trending 
downward in the period before Yelp was introduced.  To address this concern, I show that the 
result is robust to the inclusion of chain-specific time trends.     
 
6  Evidence of Bayesian Learning 
How do consumers update beliefs based on information obtained from consumer reviews?  
On the one hand, a standard model of Bayesian learning predicts that the market would react 
more strongly when ratings contain more precise information and when prior beliefs are less 
precise.  On the other hand, we have already seen that consumers use the average rating as a 
simplifying heuristic.  This may cast doubt on the sophistication of consumer response. 
It is possible to test for Bayesian learning, taking a restaurant‟s rating as a public signal of 
quality.  The market response to the signal depends on two things: consumers‟ prior beliefs about 
product quality, and the precision of the signal.  The precision of information contained in user 
reviews depends on the number of reviews and the credibility of the reviewers.   20 
 
In this section, I identify situations where the signal is more and less precise in order to test 
for Bayesian learning. 
 
6.1 Number of Reviews 
If each consumer review presents a noisy signal of quality, then having many reviews should 
cause the overall rating to contain more information and hence have a larger impact.  Table 9 
shows that this is in fact the case. 
The first column looks at all restaurants, and shows that a change in a restaurant‟s rating has 
50% more impact when the restaurant has at least 50 reviews (compared to a restaurant with 
fewer than 10 reviews).  However, this interpretation could be concerning if restaurants that are 
more  rating-sensitive  receive  more  reviews.    To  allay  this  concern,  I  restrict  the  sample  to 
restaurants that have at least 50 reviews as of October 2009 (column 2).  I then consider how 
responsive these restaurants are to changes in rating as they receive more reviews.   
Under this specification, a restaurant with at least 50 reviews is roughly 20% more rating 
sensitive than when it had fewer than 10 reviews.   
  
6.2 Certified Reviewers 
Consumer reviews are written by a non-representative sample of voluntary reviewers who 
often have little or no connection to the reader.  In order to find a review useful, a consumer must 
find it relevant, accurate, and credible.  One way to achieve this is to certify the quality of a 
reviewer.   
Yelp has a reviewer credentialing program, where they formally certify certain reviewers 
who have written a lot of reviews that Yelp has deemed helpful.  These reviewers are marked as 21 
 
“elite,” and in addition to knowing whether a reviewer was elite, readers can filter to only look at 
reviews by elite reviewers.   
If  elite  certification  gives  reviewers  a  reputation  for  leaving  informative  reviews,  then 
reviews by elite members should have a larger impact.  Consistent with the Bayesian hypothesis, 
Table 10 shows that elite reviewers have roughly double the impact of other reviewers.  Despite 
the fact that the econometrician cannot observe the criteria for certifying a reviewer as elite, this 
suggests a strong role for reviewer reputation. 
An alternative explanation of this result is that Yelp simply certifies reviewers who are better 
at  predicting  average  consumer  preferences.    There  are  several  difficulties  with  this 
interpretation.  First, Yelp does not have access to revenue data at the restaurant level, so this 
would require Yelp to know consumer preferences.  Second, if Yelp knew the distribution of 
preferences over restaurants, they could simply announce them.  Third, the regression includes 
restaurant fixed effect.  In order for the result to be spurious, elite reviewers would then have to 
be more likely to review restaurants whose reputation is about to improve.  To some extent, this 
seems plausible.  However, if it is, then rational consumers should be responding more heavily to 
elite reviews, which are then more indicative of a restaurant‟s reputation.  This argument would 
therefore not nullify the result.  Further, I find that elite reviewers only have an effect after 
becoming certified as elite. 
A second way to think of certifying reviewer quality is through the number of “friends” the 
reviewer has.  Yelp reviewers are able to form online connections, called “friends” with other 
reviewers.  Having many friends might plausibly signal that a reviewer writes precise reviews, or 
has tastes that reflect popular opinions.  Empirically, I estimate this by weighting the overall 22 
 
rating by the number of friends each  reviewer has.    I find that  the number of  friends each 
reviewer has does not affect the impact of a review.   
 
7  Discussion 
The overall message of this paper is simple.  Online consumer review websites improve the 
information  available  about  product  quality.    The  impact  of  this  information  is  larger  for 
products  of  relatively unknown quality.  As this  information  flow improves,  other  forms  of 
reputation such as chain affiliation should continue to become less influential.  On the consumer 
side, simplifying heuristics and signals of reviewer quality seem to increase the impact of quality 
information.  In this section, I put some of the results into broader context and discuss possible 
areas of future work. 
 
7.1 Comparing Consumer Reviews with Mandatory Disclosure  
This paper shows that a one-star increase leads roughly to a 9% increase in revenue.  One 
relevant  comparison  is  between  consumer  reviews  and  mandatory  disclosure  laws.    Jin  and 
Leslie (2003) find that a restaurant whose hygiene report card grade moves from a B to an A 
experiences a 5% increase in revenue relative to other grades.  Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen 
(2010)  find  that  calorie  posting  laws  cause  consumers  to  consumer  6%  fewer  calories  at 
Starbucks.   
Ultimately,  the  policy  goal  of  quality  disclosure  laws  is  to  (1)  provide  information  to 
consumers, so that they can make better decisions and (2) hold firms accountable.  This paper 
suggests that consumer review websites can be equally as effective at altering demand, although 
there is no hard evidence on the correlation between Yelp ratings and more objective quality 23 
 
measures.  In ongoing work, I am estimating the correlation between Yelp ratings and other 
objective quality measures. 
 
7.2 Comparing Yelp and Other Reviews 
Clearly  Yelp  is  not  the  only  way  in  which  consumers  learn  about  restaurant  quality.  
However, Yelp is striking in the sheer number of restaurants that contain non-trivial numbers of 
reviews.  Appendix 4 shows the percent of restaurants covered by different review systems in 
urban areas.  As discussed, Yelp currently contains reviews of 70% of restaurants in Seattle.  In 
contrast, Zagat is only a 5% sample (Gin and Leslie 2009) in Los Angeles.  My own data shows 
that  the  Seattle  Times  -  a  local  paper  that  also  reviews  restaurants  -  contains  even  fewer 
restaurants, as does the magazine Food & Wine.     
 
7.3 Comparative Incentive Problems of Consumer Reviews and Chains 
Chain  affiliation  helps  to  increase  the  amount  of  information  available  about  restaurant 
quality.  However, chain affiliation can also lead to free-riding (Jin and Leslie 2009) and high 
monitoring  costs  (Kaufmann  and  Lafontaine  1994).    Consumer  reviews  may  reduce  these 
incentive  problems.    This  is  one  reason  why  consumer  demand  is  shifting  from  chain  to 
independent restaurants in the period following the introduction of Yelp.   On the other hand, 
consumer reviews create separate incentive issues, such as an underprovision problem (Avery 





7.4 Welfare Gains from Yelp   
It  seems  uncontroversial  to  assert  that  providing  this  information  to  consumers  might 
improve welfare in various ways.  As evidence, I discuss two results. 
First, Yelp  causes  demand to  shift  from  chains  to  independent  restaurants.   By  revealed 
preference,  consumers‟  expected  utility  from  going  to  independent  restaurants  must  then  be 
higher.  This can be viewed as a welfare gain resulting from either better restaurants or better 
sorting between consumers and restaurants. 
Second, revenue is a key determinant of a restaurant‟s decision to exit.  Hence, Yelp may 
have a long-run effect on exit behavior of firms.  Assuming Yelp measures are a reasonable 
measure of true quality, then Yelp may help to drive worse restaurants out of business, which 
would be a second source of welfare gain.  In ongoing work, I am estimating the relationship 
between Yelp and exit decisions. 
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Table 1: Penetration of Yelp Over Time
Year Quarter Total In Yelp In Yelp Quarterly Total Per Restaurant
2003 1Q 1,434    0% 0 0 0.0
2003 2Q 1,485    0% 0 0 0.0
2003 3Q 1,497    0% 0 0 0.0
2003 4Q 1,497    0% 0 0 0.0
2004 1Q 1,509    0% 0 0 0.0
2004 2Q 1,515    0% 0 0 0.0
2004 3Q 1,512    0% 0 0 0.0
2004 4Q 1,545    0% 10 10 1.4
2005 1Q 1,530    1% 4 14 1.6
2005 2Q 1,569    1% 21 35 1.6
2005 3Q 1,575    15% 537          572        2.4
2005 4Q 1,566    22% 529          1,101     3.3
2006 1Q 1,554    28% 931          2,032     4.6
2006 2Q 1,563    33% 882          2,914     5.6
2006 3Q 1,572    37% 1,070       3,984     6.8
2006 4Q 1,596    40% 1,591       5,575     8.8
2007 1Q 1,578    44% 2,372       7,947     11.4
2007 2Q 1,590    47% 2,973       10,920   14.5
2007 3Q 1,581    51% 3,519       14,439   18.0
2007 4Q 1,578    54% 3,450       17,889   21.1
2008 1Q 1,548    57% 4,766       22,655   25.7
2008 2Q 1,548    60% 5,083       27,738   30.0
2008 3Q 1,560    61% 5,905       33,643   35.1
2008 4Q 1,575    62% 5,682       39,325   40.0
2009 1Q 1,545    66% 7,640       46,965   46.4
2009 2Q 1,557    67% 7,481       54,446   52.4




























Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Revenue ($) 41,766        176,105      440,723      33 8,774,281  
Rating  14,593        3.6              0.9              1 5                
Reviews 14,593        3.0              4.8              0 82              
Elite Reviews  14,593        1.4              2.0              0 28              
Friends of Reviewers  14,593        244.5          506.3          0 15,751       
Note: All statistics are per quarter per restaurant.  









Notes: Rating is measured in deviations 
from the mean.  "On Yelp" indicates 
whether the restaurant was in Yelp at 
the time of each observation.  Robust 
standard errors are reported. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level.





























Rating x x x
Rating Quadratic x
Rating X Above x
Observations 2169 2169 2169
Restaurants 854 854 854
Note: All specifications also control for restaurant and quarter FE.  
Regressions include all observations within 0.1 stars of a 
discontinuity.  Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Dependent Variable = ln (Revenue)








Bandwidth (Stars) 0.3 0.2
Note: All specifications also control for restaurant and quarter FE.  
Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.


















Table 6: McCrary Test for Quasi-Random Assignment





Dependent Variable = Prob Mass of 0.05 Star Bin
Note: Dependent variable is the probability mass of 
observations in each 0.05 star interval.  The treatment variable 
indicates intervals that are just above a rounding threshold.
Table 7: Differential Response for Chains
All Restaurants Only Independents Only Chains














Rating X Chain - 0.055**
(0.027)
Observations 41766 39283 2483
Restaurants 3582 3439 143
Notes:  All specifications include restaurant and quarter fixed effects.  
Rating is measured in deviations from the mean.  "On Yelp" indicates 
whether the restaurant was in Yelp at the time of each observation.  
Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.





















Table 8: Test for Crowding out of Chains












Chain x x x
Restaurant FE x x x
Time Trend x x
Chain Specific Time Trend x
Observations 41766 41766 41766
Restaurants 3582 3582 3582
Notes: Yelp penetration measures the percent of restaurants on Yelp in a 
given quarter. Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.



















































Dependent Variable = ln (Revenue)
Notes:  Rating is measured in deviations from the mean. 
Regressions control for number of reviews, and include 
restaurant and quarter fixed effects.  Specification (1) 
includes all restaurants.  Specification (2) includes only 
restaurants that have at least 50 reviews as of December 
2009.  Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** 































Rating - friend wtd 0.008
(0.013)
Quarter FE x x x x
Restaurant FE x x x x
Observations 41766 41766 41766 41766
Restaurants 3582 3582 3582 3582
Dependent Variable = ln (Revenue)
Notes: Rating is measured in deviations from the mean.  "On Yelp" indicates 
whether the restaurant was in Yelp at the time of each observation.  Rating - elite 
wtd is the average of the ratings left by elite reviewers.  Rating - friend wtd weights 
the average rating by the number of friends a reviewer has as of December 2009.  
Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 




































Figure 3:  Yelp Displays Each Restaurant’s Rounded Average Rating 
 
 
Notes: Yelp prominently displays a restaurant‟s rounded average rating.  Each time a restaurant‟s 
rating crosses a rounding threshold, the restaurant experiences a discontinuous increase in the 




















Figure 4: Average Revenue around Discontinuous Changes in Rating  
 
 
Notes:  Each restaurant‟s log revenue is de-meaned to normalize a restaurant‟s average log 
revenue to zero.  Normalized log revenues are then averaged within bins based on how far the 
restaurant‟s rating is from a rounding threshold in that quarter.  The graph plots average log 
revenue as a function of how far the rating is from a rounding threshold.  All points with a 



























Appendix 2: Trip Advisor Search Volume  
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Appendix 4: Restaurants Covered by Different Information Sources 
 
 